Monday, February 19, 2018

About the Freedom Mobile Hack

It seems that everyday some company is hacked (for the same reasons). Let's see why.
Mobile syrup reported in 2018 that an anonymous hacker posted a very detailed post on Freedom Mobile's subreddit about how they managed to access customer sensitive data on FreedomMobile.ca. While this wasn't confirmed, let's stop and evaluate certain aspects of the hack from different sources.

The Code

According to the report, the hacker mentioned it only took them 23 lines of code.. While anyone can guarantee this source is reliable, depending on how it was implemented, it indeed may have been possible to build a simple python script to perform username enumeration and password bruteforcing if the necessary prevention mechanism isn't in place.

The Login Widget

I inspected the code as soon as the news was out and collected some data. On Feb 15, 2018, the login screen just after the news offered that apart from username/password, we can also login using Phone number / PIN. If you were the hacker, which login you think would be easier to guess? A password (that can be anything) or a PIN composed of 4 numeric chars? 😉

Reviewing the Phone Number widget

I'm interested about this Phone number / PIN thing because PINs are usually simple and often are used to access your device from the phone. So, they should be numerical. Let's see what the source tells us:

From the screenshot we see that:
  • they're using Angular which has its flaws. Are they running the latest version?
  • some validations happen in the front-end (I hope they revalidate in the the web server);
  • that specific validation is done using Regex (pinRegEx).
  • the min/max length: 4 chars (see the red box on the right there);
  • the "PIN not valid" on the left shows up for non-numeric chars;

Estimating the Complexity

So, a mobile number and 4 numeric chars. How complex can that be?
  • mobile numbers are public.
  • PIN requires 4 numeric characters = 10 ^ 4 or 10,000 combinations

Brute Force

So, knowing your phone number, it takes the hacker, on the worst case, only 10,000 guesses. And it can get better. For example, if your pin were 1220 (Dec, 20) it would have taken me 10% of the time to guess your password.

Username Enumeration

The above has nothing of fancy, complex or undocumented. In fact, username enumeration and password bruteforcing are present in OWASP's CSRF Prevention guide and are part of OWASP's top 10 web application risks.

The hacker confirms it:
Source: https://mobilesyrup.com/2018/02/12/freedom-mobile-security-breach/

No brute force prevention

Sight. No brute force prevention. No account lockout? No MFA? No alerts. Probably not. Worse, the company ignores the issue, states the corporate jargon and returns the responsibility to users (as if a system based on 4 digit numeric PINs, no bruteforce or password enumeration prevention were secure enough):
“We continue to strongly encourage our customers to use unique PIN numbers that are not easy to guess, and to change their PINs frequently to best protect their personal account information. (...) meeting customer demands for a resonable login process.”

Shared Responsibility

Before we wrap up, there are two more things about this hack that are worth questioning:
  • who's responsible the decision to simplify the login by using the phone/PIN widget?
  • who's responsible for not preventing brute force without any lockout mechanism or alert on the login operation?
While I don't want to discuss who's responsible for what, I don't see the developers deciding how people should perform the login on the company's website. Certainly the ability to brute force such a crucial aspect of the application was missed or ignored by the business. It's definitely a shared responsibility.

Conclusion

So, even if we assume that the hack didn't happen, 10k combinations without any prevention against CSRF, username enumeration and/or password bruteforcing is not acceptable. Everyone loses when companies try to simplify security aspects for its users but do it wrong ignoring the most critical web application security risks. In time, if you haven't read yet, check OWASP's CSRF Prevention guide.

References

See Also

For more posts about Security on this blog, please click here.

About the Author

Bruno Hildenbrand